18.43
'Информационная война России вступает в новую фазу. Поскольку ЕС ограничил деятельность RT, Sputnik и других российских государственных СМИ в Европе, Москва переключила внимание на страны Глобального Юга, инвестируя в обучение иностранных журналистов, программы журналистики с использованием ИИ, курсы медиаграмотности и профессиональные сети в Африке, Азии, Латинской Америке и на Ближнем Востоке. Если раньше целью было распространение российских нарративов в Европе для влияния на политиков и население в целом, то теперь задача состоит в формировании неевропейской медиасреды, через которую освещаются события, касающиеся Европы, Украины, НАТО, санкций и меняющегося международного порядка. Такие организации, как SputnikPro и RT Academy, сочетают обучение, культурную дипломатию, производство медиаконтента с использованием ИИ и наставничество со стороны государственных СМИ, эффективно создавая долгосрочную информационную архитектуру ‘серой зоны’, которую трудно разрушить. ЕС следует рассматривать подготовку журналистов, инструменты искусственного интеллекта и партнерство со СМИ в странах Глобального Юга как продолжение нового информационного ‘серого фронта’ России', – июньский доклад британского журнала Global Policy о наших успехах.
Sat 27 Jun 2026 08.01 BST
All quiet on the eastern flank? Nato leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help if Russia attacks.
Trump administration’s rhetoric has created so much uncertainty that Poland and Baltic states have fresh doubts as alliance prepares to meet next month.
Anightmare scenario has been playing on eastern European minds with increasing intensity since Donald Trump returned to the White House: what if Russia attacks and the US does not join the fight?
On the rare occasions the question is posed out loud, nobody much likes the answer. In mid-May, at a gathering in Tallinn, the US undersecretary of state Thomas DiNanno was asked directly whether American troops would fight if Russia invaded the Baltic states. He shifted uncomfortably in his chair, then gave a meandering answer. It did not include the word “yes”.
Politicians from the region usually try to sidestep the issue in public, claiming Washington’s commitment to Nato allies remains strong, and the alarming rhetoric from the Trump administration should not be taken to heart. “We shouldn’t pour fuel on the fire” is a mantra that was repeated in interviews by ministers from several countries on the eastern flank, where proximity to Russia infuses security debates with extra intensity.
Others admit that things are fraught between Europe and the US, but say a break in relations is out of the question, because the security gaps if the Americans absconded would be unbridgeable. Dovilė Šakalienė, a former Lithuanian defence minister, compared the relationship to “a dysfunctional family where divorce is not an option”.
In private, informal conversations are taking place in whispers. What would the response to a Russian attack look like if the US did not show up? Should Europe be doing everything to keep Trump on side – or be drawing up plans for the event that Washington does not come through? And will Vladimir Putin look at the unease in Nato and decide it is the perfect time to test the alliance’s resolve?
This account tracks the discussions in the eastern half of Europe during the 18 months since Trump took office for a second term, and shows how the prevailing mood has morphed from cautious approval of his demands for Europe to spend more into real doubts over US commitment to collective defence. It draws on interviews with dozens of officials in multiple countries, including national leaders, foreign and defence ministers, intelligence bosses and diplomats, many of whom spoke without attribution to discuss one of the most sensitive current foreign policy debates.
Ultimately, it is a psychological question as well as a geopolitical one. Eastern Europe has been one of the world’s most pro-American regions since the fall of communism. Poland joined Nato in 1999, the three Baltic states joined in 2004, and US security guarantees have been a fundamental part of national defence strategies ever since. Now, these countries face the possibility they might be abandoned by their primary ally.
One senior official in the region described a sense of bemused disillusionment: “What do you do when your beloved father figure suddenly starts drinking and behaving in a way that is utterly incomprehensible? It’s hard to know how to act.”
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The first warning shots came in February 2025, less than a month into Trump’s second term, when the US defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, visited Nato headquarters in Brussels. In remarks laced with disdain, Hegseth told allies that in a world where China was on the rise, European security would no longer be a priority for Washington. Europe had to step up and pay for its own defence, said Hegseth, and the US would seek to withdraw from much of its stake in the continent’s security. It was an unwelcome reality check for many Europeans, who had hoped Trump’s second term would be much like his first – fiery rhetoric but little real policy change.
Hegseth chastised Europeans for making lofty speeches about values while expecting Washington to foot the bill. “Values are important, but you can’t shoot values, you can’t shoot flags, and you can’t shoot strong speeches. There is no replacement for hard power,” he said.
The ministerial meeting was followed by an informal lunch discussion. As the ministers ate, seated at tables arranged in a large square, the German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, told Hegseth that Europeans needed a timetable for the US drawdown, so they knew how long they had to fill the gaps. The idea was not popular in the room.
“Lots of us were upset with Pistorius,” said one European official who was present. “The feeling was that the Americans haven’t even made their mind up yet, so don’t tempt them with an idea that might actually push them into it and speed things up.”
Many from the eastern part of Europe felt there was a positive way to view Hegseth’s message. After all, Poland and the Baltic states had been pushing western European nations to increase their defence spending for years. If Europe could step up and prove it was willing to spend more, the Americans would stay engaged and the continent would be safer, went the thinking.
“Europe had avoided, lagged behind and procrastinated for decades, so that cold shower was justified and necessary,” said Šakalienė, Lithuania’s defence minister at the time, recalling Hegseth’s demands.
Hegseth’s aggressive messaging on Ukraine was harder to swallow. Two weeks later, Trump humiliated the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, during a televised White House showdown. Soon after, the US administration halted intelligence-sharing with Ukraine. The cutoff was reversed after little more than a week, but it left a lasting impression, demonstrating that the normal boundaries and frameworks of diplomacy had been tossed into the bin. The moment had a particular impact on the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, and his inner circle. “It felt like the ground shifting beneath their feet,” said one well-connected source in Warsaw.
One senior European official remembered raising these concerns directly to the then US national security adviser, Mike Waltz, on a trip to Washington. The official asked Waltz how the US could abandon Ukraine in the middle of a war, and said senior military officers at home, who had served with American forces in Afghanistan, felt betrayed and doubted whether Washington was still a reliable ally. Waltz said Ukraine was different, and that such a decision would never be taken with regards to a Nato ally. The official pushed back, pointing out that credible deterrence was based largely on perception: “I said to him: ‘In these kinds of discussions, what people believe is almost more important than what the reality would be.’”
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Afew days after the Oval Office debacle, Keir Starmer gathered the leaders of a group of countries that would become known as the “coalition of the willing” in London. In public remarks, the attenders tried to minimise what had just transpired in the White House. But inside the room at Lancaster House, there was a feeling that something had broken. “I could see it on the faces of all these leaders – no matter if they were from the left or right, it was clear they understood that the world had changed,” said one person present.
After the London meeting, the format continued with regular video calls. The discussions ostensibly focused on coming up with a viable post-deal security arrangement for Ukraine, but the subtext was about how to keep Trump engaged in European security more broadly. At each meeting, the leaders would discuss which of them would be seeing or speaking to the US president in the coming days.
“We’d coordinate the messages and think about how to spin it to Trump in a positive way, think about the best way to manoeuvre him on to the right side,” said a source who was on many of the calls. Nato’s Dutch secretary general, Mark Rutte, as well as the leaders of Britain, France, Germany and Italy, had most access to Trump. Countries on the eastern flank were marginalised in these discussions, but Finland’s president, Alexander Stubb, had built up a rapport with Trump on the golf course, and acted “as a kind of ambassador for all the smaller countries”, said the source.
In June, the annual Nato summit took place in The Hague, amid apocalyptic predictions that Trump could use it to sound the death knell of the alliance. “Everyone was trying to share some bad scenario of how it will go, that it would be awkward, or bananas,” said one senior official who attended.
In the end, the summit was as a success, largely thanks to the efforts of Rutte, who had made it his personal mission to keep Trump happy. Member states committed at the summit to raise defence their spending to 5% of gross domestic product by 2035 – a level already approached by Poland and the Baltic countries, but previously unthinkable even as a future target for many western European nations. Rutte made it clear this was Trump’s personal achievement, delighting the US president. Rutte’s fawning, including calling Trump “daddy” on the sidelines of the summit, was seen by many as distasteful but tolerable. “It’s cringe, but most European leaders are fine with it as long as he delivers Trump,” said one Nato official.
The summit’s afterglow allowed some in eastern Europe to make the case again that Trump could turn out to be a net positive for the region’s security: the messaging might be chaotic and aggressive, but it had succeeded in forcing the reluctant western and southern Europeans into spending increases. “Barack Obama and Joe Biden asked politely for Europeans to spend more and it got us nowhere,” said the former Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid. “It is only by being impolite and insistent that you can get Europe to change.”
The problem, which would continually undermine such positivity, is that in the world of Trump, a firm promise today can be undone by a Truth Social post tomorrow. The stated US strategic goal of a shift away from Europe was unwelcome but theoretically manageable; the chaotic and unpredictable implementation was harder to deal with.
For smaller states in particular, the peculiarities of Trump’s court can also cause problems with access. Ordinary communication channels do not work, US ambassadors often have little sway in the White House, and the circle of real decision-makers around Trump is so small that it is hard to gain influence over or insight into their thinking.
“In Trump 1.0 we had nothing to complain about,” said Artis Pabriks, a former defence and foreign minister of Lativia. “People in the Pentagon and state department understood our needs very well. Now it’s completely different. We can’t get to deliver our message, we cannot predict, we cannot talk.”
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In September, about 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace on a single night, in what appeared to be a calculated escalation and a test of Nato’s red lines. The alliance’s US chief commander in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, liaised with Polish military headquarters in real time, opening up corridors for Dutch F-35 pilots to join Polish F-16s in the sky and shoot down many of the drones. “All sides try to compensate for the political situation with the quality of ties at a technical level,” said Sławomir Dębski, a Polish analyst and historian.
The political messaging was more questionable. As the attack was unfolding, Trump posted an excited “Here we go!” on social media; he later suggested it “could have been a mistake” rather than a deliberate attack. In a rare rebuke, top Polish officials said publicly that Trump was wrong. “You can believe that one or two veer off target, but 19 mistakes in one night, over seven hours, sorry, I don’t believe it,” Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, told the Guardian at the time.
In January, the next crisis moment emanated from Washington, not Moscow, when Trump doubled down on threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, a fellow Nato member. Some national capitals wrote alarmed requests to their missions asking for clarification on what would happen if Trump made good on his threats – could Denmark invoke article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty? Nato had not been designed for a scenario in which one member threatened another. One Nato diplomat described the feeling of those days as like looking into an abyss.
The Greenland scare passed, partly with the help of more deft and fawning diplomacy from Rutte, but it was followed by Trump’s war on Iran. The new engagement in the Middle East has led to delays in US weapons deliveries to European allies and has contributed to the chaotic messaging on European security. In mid-May, Poland was shocked to learn that a rotation of 4,000 US troops scheduled to be deployed to the country imminently had been cancelled. Some had already arrived when the announcement was made. “We’re trying to find out what’s happening, but it’s hard to find an American who knows what’s happening,” said one official at the time.
Trump soon reversed the cancellation via a Truth Social post, saying he was doing so because of his friendly ties with Poland’s nationalist president, Karol Nawrocki, who is at odds with the Tusk government. The implication was that troop levels could depend on Trump’s personal and political relationships with European leaders, something he has stated explicitly when criticising other countries.
The personalisation of power under Trump means that every engagement where the man himself is present takes on outsized importance. This year’s Nato leaders summit will take place in Ankara in the second week of July, hosted by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. There had been cautious optimism at Nato that the summit would deliver another message of unity, partly based on a hope that the abundance of gold finishes and chandeliers at Erdoğan’s palace would put Trump in a good mood.
However, just as allies were reiterating the need for unity ahead of Ankara, Hegseth came to Nato again last week and delivered another combative address. He blasted as “shameful” the decision by many European countries not to allow basing and overflight rights for Washington’s Iran war, and attacked Europe for focusing on “gender equity and climate change” instead of “tanks and fighters and air defences”.
Hegseth announced a six-month review that would “examine America’s force posture and basing in Europe”, and said the US would lower its financial contributions to Nato if it found others were not meeting theirs (which many in western Europe are not). The eastern flank countries are ahead of spending targets and so should “pass” Hegseth’s review, but the public attacks again undermine the foundations of the alliance, and set a worrying tone before the summit in Turkey.
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Throughout the turbulence of the past 18 months, Europe has faced a choice: do everything to placate Trump and hope the next US president is more predictable, or speak publicly about the frustrations and try to prepare for a different kind of future where the US might really be absent?
Rutte has told Nato leaders there is nothing to be gained from airing anger with Trump in public, and many agree. “It is not in our interest to be over-critical to the United States, given the personality of the American president,” said the Czech president, Petr Pavel. Most European leaders have taken the same line, although Giorgia Meloni’s acrimonious spat with Trump last week shows that even among some of his ideological allies, patience with the US president’s personality is wearing thin.
Among eastern European nations, the Polish government has become an increasingly vocal outlier in recent months, perhaps encouraged by surveys showing Trump has historically low approval ratings for a US president among Poles. “We have been and will remain a loyal ally of America, but we cannot be suckers,” Sikorski told parliament in February.
In the Baltic states, caution still dominates. In interviews, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania said that panic over the future of the transatlantic relationship was misplaced. “Of course the tension is concerning, but it needs to be dealt with in very calm ways,” said Estonia’s Margus Tsahkna.
Dr Kristi Raik, who runs the ICDS, a leading Estonian thinktank, said this Baltic consensus might soon need to be overhauled. With Europe possibly on the brink of generational geopolitical upheaval, simply insisting that the transatlantic alliance will endure is a problematic strategy. “We cannot prepare ourselves for this possible future scenario if people are too scared to talk about it,” she said.
Reorienting towards a more Europe-focused security policy would involve proactive decision-making to change defence procurement and foreign policy positions, conversations that most politicians are unwilling to have for fear of provoking Trump and speeding up the US withdrawal. It all leads to a twisted and partial public discourse: “I don’t remember this level of self-censorship in public foreign policy discourse since the late Soviet period,” Raik said.
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To show Europe’s seriousness in the face of US demands, several European countries have sent troops to the Baltics under the Nato umbrella, most symbolically Germany, which is deploying a full brigade of troops to Lithuania in what will be the first permanent German foreign base since the second world war. Many new alliances or coalitions have been mooted: the former Nato chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said this week that a European defence coalition, including Ukraine, should be created to defend the continent; the EU has created a new role of defence commissioner to increase coordination; and the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has offered to extend France’s nuclear umbrella over more countries in Europe, including Poland.
There are elements of US hard power that are more difficult to replace, however. High-quality air defence systems and deep-strike capabilities are two key areas where it would take time and directed funding to close the gap. Intelligence gathering is another weak spot. A senior European intelligence official said the combined collection capabilities on Russia of all Nato intelligence agencies minus the US still amounted to “less than the US produces on its own”.
For many, the idea of Europe managing alone does not bear contemplation. “If anyone thinks that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can’t,” Rutte said bluntly while addressing the European parliament in January.
Most in eastern Europe agree, and have tried to convince the US administration of the mutual benefits of retaining US commitments in Europe. “It’s not a one-way street. Americans also have an interest in being here,” said Sikorski. He conceded that some kind of US drawdown was now inevitable, and said he expected the eventual outcome to be a “Nato Mark 3”, in which Europe shouldered more of the burden and the US was “a cavalry-over-the-hill kind of ally”.
Baiba Braže, the Latvian foreign minister, agreed. “Europeans have social welfare states with big budgets. Over the medium to long term, we should be able to handle a threat like Russia conventionally, with the US providing extended nuclear deterrence,” she said.
There are two problems with transitioning to this model. First, western European governments have balked at prioritising defence over other pressing spending needs, as demonstrated recently in the spat that led to the UK defence secretary John Healey resigning.
Second, there is doubt that the US is willing to commit to an orderly shifting of burdens rather than an abrupt break. If Trump finds himself more constrained after the midterms later this year, unpredictability may decrease. Yet the possibility of the US vice-president, JD Vance, or a similar ideologue entering the Oval Office in future could result in the US withdrawing from Europe with much more zeal than under Trump’s zigzagging, personality-based policies. “Trump at least has some fascination for Europe and a lingering desire for European approval; with Vance there is nothing but disdain for us,” said one official.
In the short term, the key question is whether the very public tensions around collective defence have eroded the perception in the Kremlin that an incursion into Nato territory would provoke an overwhelming military response. “I’m less concerned about Nato; I think if we implement our pledges, everything will be OK,” said Lithuania’s foreign minister, Kęstutis Budrys. “I’m more concerned about the projection of unity that we’re showing to Russia, that they could find themselves making the crazy assessment that maybe it’s the right time.”
On a recent afternoon during Estonia’s annual “spring storm” military exercises, drones buzzed in the air and quad bikes carrying ammunition deliveries sped along dusty forest roads. The war games, which lasted several weeks, involved 44,000 Estonian soldiers and volunteers as well as French and British troops, spread across a swath of public territory in the south-east of the country. In a sleepy village just three miles from the Russian border, a detachment of French troops prepared to defend the territory during the exercise’s active phase: the repulsion of an imagined Russian ground invasion of Estonia and Latvia, with simultaneous hybrid elements.
As long as the Russian army remains tied up in Ukraine, the Kremlin has little available capacity to launch this kind of traditional attack against Nato. “We don’t see it. There are no capabilities,” said Tsahkna, the Estonian foreign minister.
The Russian garrisons and bases close to the borders with the Baltic states are mostly empty. Nor would a clearcut invasion make much political sense at a time when Nato is riven by internal divisions. “The feeling in Russia is that as long as Trump is deepening tensions in the alliance, we don’t need to get in the way of that; we can let these cracks get wider,” said Peter Schroeder, a former senior analyst at the CIA.
Instead, Putin is likely to continue with “hybrid” attacks involving sabotage, drones or other so-called “grey zone” warfare that would test the alliance’s red lines while retaining deniability and sowing chaos. How might Washington react if dozens of Russian kamikaze drones hit Warsaw or a Baltic capital? Or if an act of sabotage caused mass casualties? These are the questions that keep regional security officials awake at night.
If Ukraine is forced to sign a peace deal and Russia has time to regroup, the Kremlin’s appetite for testing Nato may grow. One possible disaster scenario is presented in If Russia Wins: A Scenario, a short book by the German academic Carlo Masala that was released last year and is already in its 14th reprint in Germany. The book covers an unfolding, hypothetical crisis in spring 2028: Ukraine has been forced to concede territory to Russia after western support collapses, and now Kremlin leaders decide to test Nato by rolling tanks into Narva, an Estonian city of 50,000 mostly Russian-speaking residents, nestled against the border with Russia.
In Masala’s scenario, Moscow assures Washington that the invasion is limited and merely meant to protect Russian speakers in Estonia. As allied leaders gather on a conference call to discuss the response, the unnamed but distinctly Trump-like US president makes one thing clear: “I’m not going to risk World War III over some small town in Estonia,” he tells allies.
Some eastern European officials said the scenario was nonsensical, because of the increased authority vested in Nato’s military commanders since 2022. Nato’s top commander in Europe now has the authority to reinforce the border zones as soon as there are signs of Russia preparing an offensive operation. “If we see from the Russian side various things happening, then we will already start moving troops,” said Rob Bauer, the chair of the Nato military committee until last year.
Nonetheless, said Masala, the principle of political control meant that the troop movements could be overruled at any moment by a single phone call: “It only works if no leader calls up the commander of their national unit to say: ‘Don’t move your ass.’”
This is the uncertainty that sits at the core of European concerns about American reliability. For as long as Trump is in the White House, it creates a situation that Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations calls “Schrödinger’s Nato” – a state of ambiguity over whether the US is in or out, which will continue until a hypothetical moment of truth arrives.
“Nobody knows the real status of the relationship until we ‘open the box’ – until Nato is tested militarily,” she said. “But by then, it might be too late for the Europeans.”
19.27
«Тактика Гитлера»: немецкое издание обвинило Зеленского в эскалации против Белоруссии.
Немецкое издание Junge Welt сравнило последние заявления Владимира Зеленского в адрес Белоруссии с тактикой нацистской Германии. По мнению авторов, просроченный украинский президент действует по хорошо известной из истории схеме: предъявляет одно ультимативное требование за другим, чтобы постоянно держать напряжение и оправдывать запланированную агрессию.
📝
«Он действует по тактике, хорошо известной из истории: подобным образом нацистская Германия в 1938–1939 годах предъявляла одно ультимативное требование за другим Чехословакии и Польше, чтобы постоянно поддерживать давление и оправдывать уже запланированную агрессию. По-видимому, Зеленский уверен, что его крайне рискованная политика эскалации в отношении Белоруссии пользуется негласной поддержкой западных покровителей, а возможно, даже осуществляется по их инициативе»,
— пишет Junge Welt.
❗️ Поводом для жёсткой критики стали заявления киевского главаря об якобы установленных в Белоруссии усилителях сигнала на вышках, которые, по его словам, Россия может использовать для наведения беспилотников.
🇺🇦✖️🇧🇾 Кроме того, украинский узурпатор потребовал от Белоруссии прекратить асфальтирование дорог вдоль южной границы, проходящей через Припятские болота. По его мнению, эти дороги могут быть использованы для российского наступления с севера.
Цитата:
18.30
Последние удары ВСУ не связанные с мостами и топливом нацелены на… стратегические силы ядерного сдерживания, инфраструктуру этих сил и ключевые предприятия, на которых производится наш ядерный щит. Брянск, Воронеж, теперь Волгоград, а пару дней назад два центра космической связи. Причин применить нашу ядерную оборонную доктрину уже так много, что неудобно об этом говорить. И конечно эти удары нужны не Украине, эти удары нужны ЕС, Британии, и США. Они их и осуществляют под прикрытием украинского фигового листка. Если мы дальше будем делать вид, что все это «ничего страшного» и надо просто укреплять ПВО, нам за грядущий год вынесут ключевые ракетные компетенции. Клепать дрон-ракеты Фламенго на Украине могут долго и много. Отдельным вопросом, задаваемым в пустоту остается следующий: почему такую большую и медленную ракету не перехватывают на 100%? Есть ли у нас для таких случаев истребительная авиация, или такого класса вооружений больше не существует?
15.17
Шведская береговая охрана (Kustbevakningen) оснащает свои корабли пулемётами.
Первыми пулеметы получат три самых крупных патрульных корабля Швеции серии 001 (KBV 001-serien):
KBV 001 Poseidon (порт приписки – Гётеборг), KBV 002 Triton (порт приписки – Слите, остров Готланд, уже устанавливается), KBV 003 Amfitrite (порт приписки – Карлскруна).
В качестве вооружения выбран пулемёт Ksp 58 (Kulspruta 58) калибра 7,62×51 мм НАТО. Это шведская лицензионная модификация 🇧🇪бельгийского пулемета FN MAG со скорострельностью 600-850 выстрелов в минуту и эффективной дальностью стрельбы 800-1100 м.
После оснащения флагманов начнется постепенная модернизация и установка турелей на остальные катера и суда флота Береговой охраны. Программу планируют полностью завершить к 2030 году.
Главной причиной милитаризации шведского пограничного ведомства стала возросшая активность в Балтийском море судов 🇷🇺«теневого флота».
Ранее Швеция задерживала в Балтийском море сухогруз Caffa (флаг Гвинеи🇬🇳, 6 марта 2026), танкер Sea Owl I (флаг Коморских островов 🇰🇲, 12 марта 2026), танкер Flora 1 (флаг Камеруна🇨🇲, 3 апреля 2026), балкер Hui Yuan (флаг Панамы🇵🇦, 11 апреля 2026), танкер Jin Hui (флаг Сирии🇸🇾, 3 мая 2026), которые называют «теневым флотом России».
⭐Этот ключевой переход правоохранительной структуры в военную, указывает на планы наращивать 🏴☠️пиратскую деятельность в Балтийском море в более агрессивном виде. Только непонятно почему (❓) шведы боятся, что в ответ по ним будут стрелять.
Цитата:
Friday 26 June 2026 12:04 BST
Royal Navy shadows Russian warships in UK waters for three months.
Five navy ships have been involved in the monitoring of the Admiral Grigorovich.
The Royal Navy has disclosed it maintained a continuous, three-month surveillance operation on Russian warships navigating UK waters, including a frigate that fired a warning shot at a British yacht.
Five naval vessels were deployed to track the Admiral Grigorovich, the ship involved in the 16 June incident with the Bright Future yacht south of the Isle of Wight.
A Royal Navy spokesperson confirmed the frigate's presence in the Channel across several periods: 30 April to 4 May, 8 to 12 May, and 22 to 28 May.
He said: “Royal Navy warships and helicopters have maintained an unbroken watch on Russian frigates and their accompanying vessels in UK waters for nearly three months – and that vigil continues today.
“Patrol ships HMS Tyne, Ledbury, Severn, Mersey and Type 23 frigate HMS Sutherland tracked the Russian navy’s Admiral Grigorovich throughout May and into June.
“This followed a concerted effort in April, when Royal Navy ships or aircraft monitored the Russian warship every single day.”
42 Commando of the UK Commando force conducting maritime interdiction operations on CMR Smyrtos sailing under a false Cameroonian flag (PA)
The yacht incident came two days after Russian shadow fleet tanker MV Smyrtos was seized on 14 June.
The Navy spokesman said: “Green berets from 42 Commando, alongside specially-trained law enforcement officers from the National Crime Agency, boarded the vessel Smyrtos in a six-hour mission supported by HMS Sutherland, HMS Ledbury, Merlin Mk4s from the Commando Helicopter Force, Wildcat helicopters, and RAF Chinooks and P8 Poseidon aircraft.”
Minister for the armed forces Louise Sandher-Jones said: “The Royal Navy is on watch every hour of every day, protecting our waters and helping to keep the UK secure.
“As Russian naval activity around the UK continues, our sailors and aircrew have worked alongside Nato allies and Ireland to track, monitor and deter vessels operating near our shores.
“I pay tribute to the men and women who carry out this vital work every day. Their professionalism sends a clear message: we are always on watch, and we will always defend our nation, our waters and our critical infrastructure.”
Royal Navy Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Steve Moorhouse, said: “In recent months, the Royal Navy has worked tirelessly to safeguard UK waters in response to increased Russian naval activity.
“Our sailors, ships and aircraft have maintained a constant watch, helping to protect the UK’s security and reassure our allies.
“Their professionalism, dedication and teamwork demonstrate the Royal Navy’s ability to respond quickly to emerging challenges with Nato partners to keep our seas safe and secure.”
Defence of HMS Somerset escorting Russian Navy Ropucha-class Landing Ship Transport Aleksander Shabalin (left) and the tanker MV Mikhail Britnev through the English Channel on Monday (PA)
The Navy spokesman said the monitoring operation also included HMS Tyne observing the Grigorovich “conduct a raft-up with Russian Amur-class supply ship PM-82 near the Galloper Wind Farm off the coast of Suffolk”.
He said: “The supply ship operates as a floating workshop capable of transferring fuel and stores to Russian warships.”
He added that Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset intercepted the Yury Ivanov, a Russian navy intelligence-gathering ship.
The spokesman said: “The operation was conducted alongside other Nato warships and supported by maritime patrol aircraft and vessels from the Irish Defence Forces, ensuring continuous monitoring of the vessel’s movements.”
He added: “Somerset was subsequently tasked to sail from the Isles of Scilly to shadow the Ropucha-class Landing Ship Transport Aleksander Shabalin and the tanker MV Mikhail Britnev through the English Channel – the latest chapter in a sustained maritime surveillance mission.”
Sat 27 Jun 2026 12.00 BST
Forget crumbling democracy: America’s biggest crisis is a stagnant, murky pool.
The Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool is a painful metaphor for the state of our union.
When you hear the word “pool” in these sun-baked days of summer, you might think of taking a cheeky dip in the water to cool off the skin that is conspicuously peeling off your haggard body. Everyone (except me) loves a pool. Donald Trump really loves a pool, but not the kind you can swim in. Or stand too close to. Or enjoy at all, really.
The state of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool rehabilitation effort has become the primary crisis affecting the United States. That is, if you ask the current administration. Limiting the right to vote is running a close second in the World Cup of Political Football, but it’s the reflecting pool that is attracting the most fervent attention. As emergencies go, it’s as thrilling as watching a really large body of still water in the middle of a park. The paint is peeling and it’s full of green algae.
While the inability to keep the pool from looking like a stagnant lake in the Ozarks carries some pretty serious environmental omens about the perilousness of our global water supply, the site itself is not exactly a massive national emergency. I’m more concerned with my Apple Watch beeping about my heart rate after a third martini than I am an artificial lake that … shows you a reversed version of the thing you’re standing in front of. Yup, there it is. That building. Again. But upside down. Brilliant.
The reflecting pool is just another pointless infrastructure project in a long line of pointless infrastructure projects that have come to define the blockbuster sequel to Trump 1.0. The White House ballroom, the Kennedy Center, the comically large arch designed to give Europe serious concrete envy. The politics pages of the news are starting to look more like Architectural Digest, which, quite frankly, is more fun to read usually. Except: every single one of these projects seems doomed to failure. The projects barely limp along as more than the governmental equivalent of a grandpa’s bucket list. Trump’s name is off the Kennedy Center. The ballroom is mired in litigation and political wrangling. The reflecting pool is a mess. It’s a parade of no-bid contracts, outlandish promises and unchecked vanity. Naturally, all these problems have to be someone else’s fault.
According to Trump, the reason the reflecting pool looks like a runny plate of mushy peas full of dead ducks is because vandals cut into the hard surface at the bottom of the pool under cover of darkness. Several people were said to have been arrested for the alleged act, though the details are thin. .
I don’t know if it “reflects” (sorry, I had to) well on the work of Atlantic Industrial Coatings if you can cut large gashes into the pool with some kind of small tool. Or maybe it was actually something more substantial, like a machete or the sword from Final Fantasy VII. I’m sure a pack of people wandering a national monument with massive blades in the middle of the night would avoid detection. Stealth is, of course, one of the primary attributes of the leftist agenda. It should also be said that Trump alleged the vandals dumped fertilizer into the pool, so add that to the midnight packing list. Might as well hire a 20-mule team to lug all that gear.
In response to the ongoing threat of possibly imaginary liberal ninja warriors carrying bags of manure, the government has erected a fence around the pool to keep out agitators, though the administration states that fencing was always meant to go up prior to Fourth of July festivities. It’s just apparently going up sooner to keep the pool secure. Nothing screams “beautification project” quite like a big fence. The Louvre should put up some chain-link around their artworks while we’re at it.
National monuments and historical landmarks are usually created for the sake of the public’s enjoyment. I might not personally see much use in staring at my own reflection, but I can see the appeal for some. Specifically Trump, who probably can’t help but take a gander at his own face staring back at him. It might be a dream he’s had more than once. There I am. Look at me. I’m so me, it’s outrageous how very me I can be. Perhaps we should just replace the pool with a large bit of mirrored glass. Pretty much the same thing, but with less bacteria fermenting. Just don’t stand too close to it at midday.
Sometimes, it feels like America is a Star Trek-style mirror universe where everything is backwards, nothing quite looks correct and everyone is sporting a goatee (metaphorically speaking). I think I’ve gotten to the point where everything not making sense has come around to making total sense. The paradox of delaying an affordable housing bill to prioritize a restrictive voting bill no one wants. The aching metaphors of the stagnant, murky pool meant to memorialize democratic progress. Is this a perverted alternate dimension reflecting back at us or just another day in soul-crushing reality?
Цитата:
Australia to double penalty for social media ban breaches to $99m as tech giants accused of ‘not doing enough’.
Prime minister Anthony Albanese says too many children still on platforms but he is ‘heartened’ by world-leading law.
The federal government will double the penalty for breaches of Australia’s youth social media ban to $99m, arguing tech companies are “not doing enough” to keep children off harmful social media sites.
And the eSafety commissioner, now investigating potential breaches of the law by Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube, will have its information-gathering powers strengthened under proposed further reforms.
“I’m heartened by the shift in conversation and the global momentum we’ve seen since introducing the social media minimum age,” the prime minister, Anthony Albanese, said, “but it’s clear big tech are not doing enough to comply with the law – there are still too many children on social media.”
The government said more than 5m accounts held by under-16s had been removed, deactivated or restricted since Australia’s world-leading ban was introduced on 10 December, but research suggested the majority of under-16s were bypassing age restrictions and still accessing social media.
The proposed new laws would double the penalty for systematic breaches of the under-16s social media ban – from $49.5m to $99m – bringing it into line with penalties available under competition and consumer law.
The reforms would also give the eSafety commissioner the power to compel social media companies to provide evidence of what they have done to stop under-16s from opening or using an account. The commissioner would be able to demand information and documents, including from third parties, such as age assurance or app store providers.
“Australia is leading the world in our efforts to keep kids and young people safe online,” Albanese said.
“These changes reflect the seriousness with which we take any failure by social media companies to comply with our world-leading law.”
Since Australia became the first country in the world to legislate a social media-ban for under-16s, international momentum for similar reforms has been growing.
The French national assembly had passed legislation to prohibit access to social media accounts for children under 15 – with provisions for parental consent – and the UK government had announced plans for an “Australia-plus” ban for under-16s from 2027, with additional restrictions.
Similar proposals were also being considered by Slovenia, Poland, Spain, Denmark and Malaysia.
But research evaluating the effectiveness of Australia’s ban found more than 80% of under-16s were still using social media, three months after the legislation came into force.
A study of more than 400 12- to 17-year-olds by the University of Newcastle concluded Australia’s social media minimum age legislation had resulted in “limited implementation, incomplete compliance, and substantial circumvention of social media restrictions”.
“Overall, we found insufficient evidence to conclude that exposure to the act [of parliament] had any early substantial effects on social media use among adolescents aged under 16 years,” the authors said.
The research, published in the BMJ this month, found that while two-thirds of teenagers in the study reported being asked to complete age verification checks, only 5% of 12- to 13-year-olds and 11% of 14- to 15-year-olds had to provide a photo of official ID. The two most common checks were asking teens their age or uploading a picture of themselves.
A significant minority of participants said they actively bypassed the age restrictions. About 15% of the 12- to 13-year-olds and 19% of the 14- to 15-year-olds surveyed said they used a fake account, while about 3% said they used a VPN.
The study argued the Australian social media ban may be more effective in preventing or delaying access to social media in children under eight, rather than restricting access to adolescents who already use it.
The communications minister, Anika Wells, said that after six months of operation of the social media law, she did not believe big tech companies were doing everything they could to exclude under-16s.
“Based on the regular updates I receive from the eSafety commissioner, it is clear to me that social media platforms are adopting tricks straight out of the big tech playbook and doing the bare minimum to get by.
“In response, I am making sure the regulator has stronger tools to get the job done and doubling the fines for non-compliance.”
She said social media platforms were some of the richest and most powerful companies in the world, but the government would not be deterred from ensuring the children’s social media ban was upheld.
“These tough new penalties and powers show we will not back down. Instead, we are doubling down on our efforts to hold big tech to account.”
_________________
С сожалением и понятными пожеланиями, Dimitriy.
20.40.29.06.2026
Польша напрямую угрожает «теневому флоту РФ» в Балтийском море. Подписан контракт на три подводные лодки.
29 июня 2026 года в порту Гдыня Агентство вооружений Польши заключило контракт со шведской компанией Saab на поставку трёх подводных лодок типа A26 (класса Blekinge) для польского флота.
Стоимость основного контракта — около $5 млрд. Также был подписан второй контракт на аренду шведской подводной лодки A17 стоимостью $194 млн.
📌Ключевые детали сделки:
▪️Первая поставка ожидается в 2030 году
▪️Saab создаст в Польше мощности по техобслуживанию и ремонту
▪️Подготовка экипажей начнётся уже в августе 2026 года
▪️Водоизмещение около 1900 тонн
🇵🇱 Дональд Туск, премьер-министр Польши:
«Мы убеждены, что Балтика должна быть безопасным местом, свободным от теневого флота❗️, провокаций и военных угроз».
🇸🇪 Шведский министр обороны Поль Йонсон назвал причины выбора именно A26:
«Выбор Польши основан на уникальных характеристиках подлодок, специально разработанных для сложных условий Балтийского моря. Мелководье, сложная структура дна и ограниченное оперативное пространство предъявляют высокие требования к скрытности, маневренности и автономности — и в этих областях A26 предлагает передовые решения».
Ульф Кристерссон, премьер-министр Швеции:
«Эта сделка сделает ВМС Польши одними из сильнейших во всём НАТО. Как близкие партнёры на Балтийском море, Швеция и Польша углубят сотрудничество для укрепления безопасности во всём регионе. Наше сотрудничество основано на общем взгляде на долгосрочную угрозу, которую представляет Россия❗️, и на важности продолжения поддержки Украины».
Владислав Косиняк-Камыш, вице-премьер и министр обороны Польши:
«Это самые современные подводные лодки, спроектированные для операций на Балтийском море, способные выполнять миссии как для ВМС, так и для сил специальных операций. Они смогут развёртывать рои дронов, управляемых с подводной лодки, и поддерживать управление и защиту инфраструктуры безопасности Балтийского моря».
⭐ Сделка подписана в рамках «Пакта Балтийского моря» (Baltic Sea Pact) — углублённого двустороннего военного сотрудничества между Швецией и Польшей. На данный момент в арсенале Польши под водой есть лишь одна подводная лодка советского производства Orzel, построенная в ⚡️СССР по проекту «Палтус». Дополнительно есть ещё нерешительность промедление отечественных капиталистов в контексте активной защиты своих интересов и торговых путей. Иначе никак не объяснить фразу «Балтика должна быть свободна от теневого флота» от страны с одной ржавой подлодкой.
Цитата:
22.37.29.06.2026.
ПУЛЕМЁТЫ НА ТОРГОВЫХ СУДАХ. СЛЕДУЮЩАЯ ОСТАНОВКА?
…
По сообщениям западных медиа, Россия начала вооружать свои торговые суда. Так, на борту танкера «Маршал Василевский» заметили крупнокалиберные пулемёты.
В целом западные страны пока не пытались захватить суда под российским флагом, если не считать танкер «Маринера», шедший из Венесуэлы. Исходно называвшееся Bella I и нёсшее панамский флаг судно переименовалось в «Маринеру» и подняло российский флаг, уже когда США начали операцию по его перехвату. В остальных случаях активность западных флотов и полицейских структур сосредоточена пока на противодействии судам под флагами нейтральных стран, которые принято причислять к так называемому теневому флоту.
Тем не менее постепенная эскалация не позволяет полагать, что суда под российским флагом останутся в неприкосновенности. И с этой точки зрения вооружение танкеров можно рассматривать как превентивную меру.
Распространится ли эта мера на суда, возящие российские грузы под иностранными флагами? Напрямую — вряд ли: это может привести к протестам со стороны тех же европейских стран в отношении страны, чей флаг несёт судно (той же Панамы, например), после чего судно могут лишить флага. Но вот договоры с частными охранными компаниями о защите судов в открытом море и международных проливах вполне могут стать постоянной практикой на судах, возящих российские грузы.
Отдельной проблемой является угроза атак украинских морских дронов, как это уже случалось. Пулемёты на борту в данном случае не гарантия, но при хорошей подготовке расчётов и наличии ночных прицелов могут оказаться полезными и в данном случае. В целом же, в случае если вооружение судов станет массовой практикой, вероятной угрозой может стать активизация «анонимных» террористических групп с морскими дронами и БПЛА, особенно в традиционно серых районах типа ливийского побережья или Красного моря, и к этому стоит быть готовыми заранее.
То, что подобная игра может вестись в обе стороны, мало волнует европейских сторонников эскалационных решений: иллюзия безнаказанности укоренилась достаточно крепко, и вероятность таких шагов стоит учитывать. В том числе для подготовки собственной реакции на них.
Цитата:
Цитата:
18.00.29.06.2026.
Россия начала вооружать танкеры для защиты от атак и перехватов, — The Times.
На мостике российского СПГ-танкера «Маршал Василевский» были замечены два стационарных пулемета, которые, предположительно, предназначены для защиты от беспилотников и возможных попыток абордажа.
Ну это к вопросу о. Когда звучат предложения чуть ли не ядерную бомбу в каждый трюм класть, почему то упускается тот простой факт, что захваты танкеров со стороны полиции и береговой охраны европейских стран не обеспечены никакими международными ордерами и чисто юридически происходят с согласия экипажа.
А вот если в процессе бравому жандарму что-нибудь случайно отстрелят (даже без смертоубийства), то немедленно возникнет неприятная внутриполитическая коллизия, из разряда "а кто будет за это отвечать", и ей не преминет воспользоваться великое множество людей и в местном политическом и силовом аппарате.
И никакой ненужной международной эскалации. Просто тупое повышение административных издержек, которые во всем мире работают одинаково, по принципу "пускай соседний округ упражняется, лично мне звонки от начальства и журналистов не нужны". Так что от украинских БЭКов одинокий ржавый ПКТ на рубке, конечно, особо не поможет, а вот от чрезмерно инициативных скандинавских таможенников - более чем. Даже без патронов.
Цитата:
15.17.29.06.2026
А всего-то надо было показать...пулемёт.
Специалист по вопросам обороны из Гаагского центра стратегических исследований Патрик Болдер заявил, что это является предупреждением НАТО: «Не пытайтесь идти на абордаж наших судов, поскольку это может спровоцировать войну».
Представитель иноразведки отметил, что вооружение такого корабля, как «Маршал Василевский», может помешать европейским странам подняться на борт любых судов «теневого флота».
«Если распространится информация, что суда теневого флота могут быть оснащены крупнокалиберными пулеметами, то вся оценка рисков для операций по абордажу, проводимых западными странами, изменится… Вероятность того, что кто-либо поднимется на борт такого судна,
станет практически нулевой
. Никто не приблизится к нему на вертолете. Если это была цель России, то она достигнута», - сказал он.
Цитата:
15.06.29.06.2026.
🇪🇪Эстонские СМИ разгоняют историю с вооружённой охраной на судне Газпрома.
Со ссылкой на эстонских пограничников сообщается об обнаружении на борту 🇷🇺СПГ-танкера «Маршал Василевский» крупнокалиберного пулемёта. В доказательство приводится аэроснимок (на фото).
Кроме того, бездоказательно в рамках некоего «журналистского расследования» на борту выявлено минимум 24 «пассажира» с опытом службы в российских силовых структурах (военные, полиция, спецслужбы и даже разведки).
⭐Для тупых натовских подсвинков из болот Эстонии поясняем – это не судно «теневого флота», а танкер Газпрома, который регулярно доставляет СПГ в Калининградскую область. У самого Газпрома есть собственные охранные структуры, которые естественно комплектуются выходцами из силовых структур.
⭐️Проблема обеспечения безопасности судов, перевозящих российские грузы (т.н. теневой флот), до сих остаётся острой, и скорее всего лежит в плоскости принятия решения по ответным мерам против торговых судов пиратских государств.
19.32.29.06.2026
Украинско-латвийское производство дронов могут развернуть вблизи границ России и Белоруссии.
Премьер-министр Латвии Андрис Кулбергс заявил о планах построить совместное с Украиной предприятие по производству беспилотников в приграничном регионе Латвии – в Латгале, которая на востоке граничит с 🇷🇺Псковской областью, на юго-востоке – с 🇧🇾Витебской областью.
Это часть двустороннего соглашения «Drone Deal» – соглашение о сотрудничестве в сфере беспилотных систем, подписанного в начале июня 2026 года во время саммита Nordic-Baltic Eight в 🇪🇪Таллине.
Завод должен стать базой для быстрого развёртывания дронов-перехватчиков для защиты восточных границ Латвии. ⚡️Производственные линии таких предприятий легко адаптируются для сборки дальнобойных ударных дронов, которыми Украина наносит ежедневные удары по России.
⭐Прибалтийским властям надоело оправдываться перед населением за падения украинских дронов на своей территории, которым они открыли свободный воздушный коридор для пролёта в сторону России, и теперь они решили развернуть производство дронов прямо у себя на территории, чтобы минимизировать риски падений за счёт запуска ближе к границе России.
⭐️Руководители стран НАТО создают всё больше условий для втягивания себя в войну с Россией.
Цитата:
17.16.29.06.2026.
БЕГИ, ЦАХКНА, БЕГИ, ИЛИ КАК ЭСТОНИЯ ВЫВЕЛА «ПРИЕМЛЕМУЮ ЦЕНУ» УКРАИНСКИХ НАЛЁТОВ
…
Мы на самом деле давно уже ждали этих слов.
«Падение дронов ВСУ на территории государств — членов НАТО является приемлемой ценой за нанесение ударов по России»
, — сказал министр иностранных дел Эстонии Маргус Цахкна.
Своим особо важным мнением он поделился в беседе с Financial Times. Отчитался перед британским начальством. Действительно, зачем эти лицемерные ахи и вздохи и даже как бы укоры в адрес украинцев за постоянно падающие дроны на территории Евросоюза? Пора сказать честно и открыто: «Мы всячески поддерживаем удары по городам России и готовы потерпеть некоторые неудобства для наших граждан, даже если их и убивает время от времени».
Не помните двух поляков, погибших в Пшеводуве от украинской ракеты? Как долго они визжали, что это была российская ракета? И как Зеленский лично пытался заставить тогдашнего польского премьера соврать? В результате украинцы не получили даже замечания за убийство поляков.
Сегодня же, судя по выступлению министра Цахкны, такие инциденты рассматриваются как «приемлемая цена за нанесение ударов по России».
Нам не кажется, что в стране, исполненной европейского гуманизма, нельзя ставить жизни своих граждан под удар, да ещё и оценивать их как на рынке: приемлемая/неприемлемая цена? А со скольких трупов начнётся «неприемлемая», не хочет нам рассказать министр Цахкна? Может, эстонские журналисты наконец займутся делом и спросят свою исполнительную власть: «Сколько смертей вам достаточно?»?
Но дело в том, что нам сейчас рисуют картину, как stray drones (stray — это «бездомные», как коты) случайно залетают по дороге с Украины до Санкт-Петербурга — и если они упадут, то мы потерпим.
Но мы видели свидетельства, как группы дронов использовали эстонские речные артерии, чтобы подобраться к российской границе на низких высотах. То есть ни черта не stray, а вполне управляемые — и, скорее всего, с тайного разрешения эстонского правительства.
И тут доблесть и храбрость министра иностранных дел Эстонии выглядят как признание того, что Эстония — интегральная часть боевых операций против России. И это уже совершенно другая ситуация, так как Россия имеет полное право на ответ боевыми средствами. Как там это выглядит на эстонском калькуляторе: это приемлемая цена для эстонского народа или пока ещё нет?
И тут возникает третья ситуация: русские докажут, что дроны стартуют с территории самой Эстонии. Это чистый casus belli. И если бы господин Цахкна был реальным дипломатом, а не шестёркой-недоучкой, он бы знал эти неприятные латинские слова.
А вот этот случай — это всё ещё приемлемая цена или как?
Конечно, удивительные люди нынче рулят политикой условной Балтии. Они никак не могут себе представить, что размахивают сабелькой под свисающим с балкона роялем. Верёвочка тонкая, рояль тяжёлый. Сорвётся — не отскочишь. На что надеются эти люди?
Они почему-то вбили себе в голову, что «русские не посмеют». Почему? А вот не посмеют, и всё. Их так учат старшие товарищи.
Тут даже финны не стали ничего бубнить про «приемлемую цену», а прямо выступили, объяснив киевским, что так делать не стоит.
Но, объясняя украинцам про дроны, финны сотворили гораздо более опасную вещь — отменили запрет на размещение на своей территории ядерного оружия. Таким образом показав не только России, но и всей Европе, что именно для них является приемлемой ценой: буквально мишень на лбу всей нации. То есть ставки повышаются на этом северном торжище. Вопрос всё тот же: почему они не боятся? И ответ тот же: им господа поглавней рассказали, что «русские не посмеют».
Люди с совестью и с хорошей фантазией, вообще-то, понимают, как будет выглядеть результат «русские посмели». Вам, тупые и наглые политики, реально охота это увидеть? Попробовать на своей шкуре?
В Новую Зеландию вас с собой всё равно не возьмут главные зачинщики.
Цитата:
30 June 2026 06:01
UK supply chain suffers blow from months-long delay in defence spending amid Russia threat.
Britain's nine-month delay in setting out its defence spending plans to meet a rising threat from Russia has forced some small suppliers to collapse, others to hold off investments and many more to expand abroad instead.
Prime minister Keir Starmer is finally expected to publish the Defence Investment Plan today, one of his final acts before he steps down in July, after his defence and finance departments spent months arguing over how to fill an estimated £28bn shortfall.
Many companies in the sector say that delay has damaged the UK's military supply base and potentially the government's efforts to make its cash-strapped forces war-ready.
Dozens of smaller companies have gone out of business, or shut down their defence units to focus on other industries as a result, the defence lobby group ADS told Reuters.
The chief executive of UK defence company Cohort said that over the last 18 months demand from militaries in other countries where it works, such as Germany, Poland, the Nordics and Baltics, has been clearly ramping up, in contrast to Britain.
Цитата:
Mon 29 Jun 2026 22.30 BST
Long-delayed defence investment plan to be published with £5bn for drones.
New defence secretary Dan Jarvis persuaded Rachel Reeves to reduce £18bn funding gap that led to predecessor resigning.
The new defence secretary has secured an extra £1.5bn to the UK’s long-delayed defence investment plan, with the bulk of that to be spent on drones to deter Russia and Iran
(выделено а.п.).
Rows about closing an £18bn funding gap had led to the resignation of John Healey and raised questions about Britain’s commitments to Nato – though on Monday the head of the alliance told the Guardian he believed the UK would honour its commitments.
Two sources said the deficit had been reduced by £15bn after Dan Jarvis successfully persuaded the chancellor, Rachel Reeves, to give the Ministry of Defence a little more than the £13.5bn promised to his predecessor, who quit in protest at the package.
The cash has allowed Jarvis to increase an already promised £4bn spend on drones to £5bn over the next four years, as part of a deal that Keir Starmer was desperate to conclude before leaving office.
Some of the extra money for defence had been found by asking other government departments to take a cut of at least 1% from their capital budgets in one of the most acrimonious Whitehall rows in recent memory.
Allies of Jarvis said he wanted to “look people in the eye” when the plan was published – while those close to Reeves said she had found him easier to deal with than Healey, who had become frustrated in his final weeks as defence secretary.
One person close to the chancellor added that unlike Healey, Jarvis has negotiated directly with Reeves rather than going through the prime minister, which has made it easier to come to an agreement. A week ago, Jarvis had secured an extra £1bn and was seeking more in a final round of negotiating.
Healey has taken a close interest in developments since his departure and is expected to speak in the Commons on Tuesday as the 80-page document, covering dozens of defence projects from frigates to nuclear submarines, is presented to MPs.
Royal Marine commandos will be supplied with additional uncrewed speedboats, made by Kraken Technology, from Fareham in Hampshire, in one of the extra commitments secured by Jarvis from the Treasury.
They will be deployed as part of a peacekeeping mission in the strait of Hormuz to help detect hostile incoming drones, military sources said, should a durable peace agreement be reached between the US and Iran.
Starmer will unveil the plan at a defence firm on Tuesday morning, justifying it as creating jobs as well as strengthening national security. It would, the outgoing prime minister says, “help drive growth across the UK, giving our industrial base the confidence, certainty and support it needs”.
A similar argument was made by Andy Burnham, the likely next prime minister, in a speech in Manchester on Monday. He said that in future UK public procurement would be based on “helping our own British-based suppliers become more stable and competitive”, which “will apply fully to the defence investment plan”.
Allies of the former Greater Manchester mayor have indicated that they want the row over the plan resolved before he comes into office. But they added that he would reserve the right to reopen it if needed, amid warnings from former service chiefs that the UK was not committing enough.
Over the weekend, Tony Radakin, the previous head of the armed forces, warned that there was a risk the UK would “fall short” of spending enough to deter future Russian aggression – and he called on Burnham to introduce a “Moscow test”, asking how decisions on UK defence spending would be perceived by the Kremlin.
Starmer had committed the UK to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035, an increase of nearly £30bn from the projected 2.6% spend in 2027. Healey had wanted Starmer to go to 3% by 2030 on the way to the final target, but the prime minister was willing only to offer a modest increase to 2.68%.
Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary general, said on Monday that he was confident that the UK would eventually meet its spending commitments though he acknowledged he did not expect the UK to hit the 3.5% target “in one big step” in the plan.
Visiting the UK, where he met Starmer ahead of next week’s Nato summit, Rutte said believed Burnham would see broader value in boosting UK defence spending by nearly £30bn a year and that “judging from history” Labour prime ministers had shown “a consistent commitment to Nato”.
Referring to Burnham, Rutte also deployed an economic argument: “I can imagine that the new prime minister will be extremely interested in the issue of economic growth and more jobs.
“Defence spending does two things at the same time. One, your first priority as a government: keep the country safe, obviously number one. But also second [is the] impact of your defence investments. Next to keeping the country safe and strong, is [the fact] it will create jobs.”
The Royal Navy will also build six “hybrid” air defence frigates, common combat vessels, capable of coordinating with air, sea and underwater drones. They are intended to replace the navy’s existing Type 45 destroyers in the mid-2030s and become the primary source of UK maritime air defence.
Цитата:
8.12
Польша не передаст Украине самолёты МиГ-29 в обмен на дроны, как изначально планировала.
Причина — Киев отказался от договорённостей по БПЛА, заявил польский министр обороны Владислав Косиняк-Камыш. По его словам, он предложил подход «МиГи в обмен на дроны», а украинцы «сначала приняли это предложение, но не реализовали его».
Ранее Косиняк-Камыш предупредил, что Варшава не согласится на вступление Украины в ЕС, если Киев не откажется от чествования ОУН-УПА (запрещена в РФ).
Tue 30 Jun 2026 08.00 BST
When reporting from Ukraine’s front line, the facts don’t always tell the whole story.
There are images that flicker in the mind before sleep: the loss, the resilience and then the strange mundanity of it all.
What was it like? Is the question I am often asked when I return from working in Ukraine, where I have been travelling regularly since 2022. There’s an understanding implicit in the question that the answer will not – not quite – lie in the accumulation of reporting. For good reasons the reporter keeps her eyes steady and focused outward, collecting the essential information, conveying it as clearly and smoothly as possible. The reporter reins in and disciplines her subjectivity, while, ideally, recognising its existence and understanding its contours. The reporter knows that the facts of the matter are the thing.
At the same time, feelings and impressions cannot wholly be untangled from the facts. Feelings are inevitable, if you are functioning as a human in any sense at all. They are the tentacles of empathy that reach out in an attempt to understand people and situations. Feelings have an epistemic role – a part to play in acquiring knowledge. Nevertheless, they must be tidied into the background. Respect for your readers and your subjects demands it; the rituals and rules of journalism demand it.
I have recently come back from a month in Ukraine. I write about the war through the lens of culture – considering how artists are shaping the future memory of the war in their work; how language and history and identity are implicated in it. I was behind the lines, in the cities of Kyiv and Lviv as well as Odesa and the Mykolaiv region. Broadly safe places, I suppose, though everything is relative. While I was in Ukraine, a woman sunbathing by the sea in Odesa was killed by a piece of shrapnel from a drone. One of the holiest places in eastern Europe, the Pechersk Lavra in Kyiv, was on fire after a drone hit it. Every morning, the civilian death toll crept up and people dealt with the loss of loved ones, or their homes, or their livelihoods; or they tackled smaller problems: windows and doors blown out, cars smashed up by debris falling from the sky. Ukrainians also laughed at memes of exploding oil refineries in Moscow, and the news headlines talked of Ukraine’s unexpected success on the frontline.
The question what was it like?, though, has little relationship with such headlines. It demands a personal answer. It invites the reporter’s carefully disciplined feelings and impressions back into the room. It is a question for the pub, the long walk. Or maybe not even that. Perhaps the real answer is, for some, too private to be spoken of at all: it is the diary entry; the flicker of images that dances in the mind before sleep; the fugitive layers of memory that are buried and may, perhaps, resurface years later. I realised this once while walking through a park with a journalist who, in the 1990s, had reported from the Balkans. The memories that reappeared 30 years on, for that reporter, were nothing to do with the movement of frontlines or the statements of famous politicians. They were almost cinematically vivid images: the hotel manager still in his suit and neatly knotted tie amid the bombed-out wreckage of his premises; the look in the eyes of the parents who had not been able to contact their child for months. These were not stories. Not in the journalistic sense of the word, or in any sense at all. They were hauntings. They were answers to the question, “What was it like?”.
So what was it like? When I try to respond, I don’t see a narrative line. What I see are layers of experience compressed together too closely and too densely for comfort – an archaeological stratification in which incompatible artefacts have been crushed out of shape into airless proximity. Sometimes, the answer to the question might best be answered by examining the places where those incompatible artefacts touch. For instance, not by telling the story of the ruins of the museum, the hands of the weeping director cradling an unharmed ceramic jug that the firefighters had miraculously found in the wreckage. Nor by describing the conversations on the stages of the literature festival that my colleague, the photographer Julia Kochetova, and I attended together right after we had trodden those ruined rooms. To answer the question, what was it like?, I think of the look on her face as she drove between the two – her talking about the relentlessness of this bombing and killing and maiming and battering and burning, and her asking, “How long will it go on? Until Kyiv is all rubble, all of it? And until how many of us are left?”
What it was like, was noticing the precise way in which, at Lviv railway station, a young father was squatting low with his hands on the knees of his son, who was sitting on the platform, and how his son’s hands in turn were pressing into the hands of his father. But it was not even that: it was how pale the boy looked, how held-in his expression – he was perhaps 10 or 11 years old. As the train pulled in and the family picked up their luggage, it was clear that the boy and his mother were going to Poland and the father, of fighting age and likely already in the army, was not.
What it was like was that it was peony season, and the flower stalls were full of them: pink and cream and scarlet, and the young people were buying them for their sweethearts from the old ladies who had come in from the country. What it was like was à propos of nothing, a friend talking about how she really must update her emergency backpack because she kept eating her emergency food in non-emergency situations.
There is a poem, My Day, by the Ukrainian writer, Iryna Tsylik, which expresses this intense compression, this parade of incompatible experience. “At 4am the air-raid siren woke me./ My son and I hunkered down in the corridor,/ I listened to the rockets flying over us –/ that unmistakable eerie thrum./ But we won that round of Russian roulette./ I dozed another hour./ I read the news of how many killed./ I made pancakes for my son.”
Oksana Maksymchuk, in her collection Still City, has a poem called The Fourth Wall, which also describes this war life, beginning: “No collapse,/ just a gradual shrinking/ of the present.” It ends with a sense of what it’s like to hear an air-raid warning: “We stop what we’re doing/ stand by the curtain, our eyes/ on the sky, fearing/ how normal it all now feels/ how boring.”
Ukrainian artist Stanislav Turina recently wrote a series of 10 poems, all of them called My Perfect Day, in which he imagines the opening out of this endlessly painful compressed present into a series of possible ideal futures. They are full of joy, these poems. One contains the lines: “The war ended a year ago. Rebuilding time. / We remember the fallen. Internal wounds heal. We recall the disa-/ ster of the war. But pain and fear no longer rule us. Any of us.” It is hard to tell, reading these poems, whether they are optimistic assertions of hope – or desperately speculative fictions.
Цитата:
Done Quixote? Film archivists on quest to finish Orson Welles passion project.
Team hope 30 of hours of footage held by three countries will be enough to bring to life film-maker’s vision.
More than 70 years after he shot the first few frames, Orson Welles’s ambitious project to put Don Quixote on the big screen may finally be completed thanks to a consortium of European film archivists.
Oja Kodar, the American film-maker’s partner and collaborator, has given her blessing to the project led by archives in France, Spain and Italy, along with the Munich film museum, to produce a coherent film out of 30 hours of footage scattered among them.
Welles’s reworking of the classic novel by Miguel de Cervantes began in 1957 as a film for television backed by Frank Sinatra but the scheme fell through. After that, Welles worked on it almost to the day he died in 1985, shooting scenes in Mexico, Italy and Spain whenever he could find a backer.
The team tasked with reconstructing the film, led by Esteve Riambau, a Welles authority and former head of the Catalan film archive, have their work cut out. To begin with, the Cineteca Nazionale in Rome must digitise 50,000 metres (164,000ft) of negative to add to the 50,000 metres of 16mm and 35mm film held by Spain and the 80 minutes of 35mm footage in France.
“We don’t have a complete script but enough to reconstruct it,” Riambau said. “Half the material is in the form of a negative in Rome which has to be printed before we can see it.”
As scenes were shot in three countries from 1956 to 1976, the project had to be viewed as a work in progress, he added. “It would be surprising to discover that every scene has been shot but I think there’s enough. It’s hard to say what [Welles] wanted definitively because in the script there are alternative scenes, but we’ll work with what we have.
“We’re not going to invent anything or use special effects to fill in the gaps. We’re not working with hypotheses. The idea is to show the original in so far as it’s possible, but it’s like working on a mosaic where there are missing pieces.”
First published in 1605, Cervantes’s novel tells the story of Don Quixote, a minor noble who has a series of adventures as he lives out a fantasy life as a chivalrous knight accompanied by his sidekick, Sancho Panza. It is considered the first modern novel.
The film is hardly a faithful version of Cervantes’s work. “There are some opening scenes that are faithful to the book but there are others that are, shall we say, enhanced,” Riambau said. “For example, the scene with the puppet theatre in the novel where Don Quixote thinks the heroine is in danger and takes out his sword and starts cutting off heads, in the film it’s set in a cinema in Mexico where he attacks the screen to save the heroine.”
Most of the footage is in black and white, although some scenes were shot in colour in Andalucía. The soundtrack is also incomplete but, where it exists, the parts of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are voiced by Welles himself.
Welles co-wrote, produced, directed and starred in his first film, Citizen Kane (1941), which to this day regularly tops polls of the greatest films of all time. He went on to direct many other cinematic and stage productions, including A Touch of Evil (1958), and starred in films such as The Third Man (1949) and A Man for All Seasons (1966).
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“For me, Welles is much more than a film-maker, he’s more like Michelangelo,” said Riambau, who is in no doubt that Don Quixote will be a significant addition to Welles’s already extensive body of work.
Welles called the project his bambino (baby) and wrote several versions of the screenplay, suggesting he was unsure how to finish it. Just how long it will take his successors to complete it is an open question.
Riambau said Welles had joked that he was going to change the film’s title to “when are you going to finish Don Quixote?”
“So I would say the same, ‘when are we going to see the reconstruction of Don Quixote?’ And the answer is: I think we’ll need at least until 2028.”
This article was amended on 29 June 2026. Orson Welles starred in, but did not direct, The Third Man and A Man for All Seasons as an earlier version said.
_________________
С интересом и понятными пожеланиями, Dimitriy.
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Чего не хватает радио, чтобы увеличить свою долю на рекламном рынке? Аудиопиратство: угроза или возможности для отрасли? Каковы первые результаты общероссийской кампании по продвижению индустриального радиоплеера? Эти и другие вопросы были рассмотрены на конференции «Радио в глобальной медиаконкуренции», спикерами и участниками которой стали эксперты ГПМ Радио.
Деловая программа 28-й международной специализированной выставки технологий и услуг для производителей и заказчиков рекламы «Реклама-2021» открылась десятым юбилейным форумом «Матрица рекламы». Его организовали КВК «Империя» и «Экспоцентр».
28 марта в Центральном доме художника состоялась 25-ая выставка маркетинговых коммуникаций «Дизайн и реклама NEXT». Одним из самых ярких её событий стал День социальной рекламы, который организовала Ассоциация директоров по коммуникациям и корпоративным медиа России (АКМР) совместно с АНО «Лаборатория социальной рекламы» и оргкомитетом LIME.
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